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I thank Prof. Brophy, Judge Radigan, and Ms. Hillman for their
comments on Social Control of Wealth. I am especially grateful for the
time and effort they have expended because taken together their obser-
vations draw from the piece support for two important messages. First,
that the role of lawyers in the law reform in our nation is one of ratio-
nalizing and reforming, as Prof. Brophy puts it. Second, that the particu-
lar type of reform we call codification has the best chance of success
when it looks to reform by supplementation of the existing law rather
than by abolishing and trying to build completely anew, as Judge Radi-
gan and Ms. Hillman state. I agree wholeheartedly with both these
comments, even though in my heart of hearts I often wish that the Re-
visers had succeeded in radically reforming the law of trusts.
Both observations, in turn, are based on a profound truth about the
legal system of the United States. The making of the laws is in the hands
of our judges as much as it is in the hands of the legislators-not exactly
a striking observation but important nonetheless, I think, at least when
we come to make it because we can see an historical example of judges
forcing legislation into the procrustean bed of existing general principles
sanctioned by the passage of time. It is not insignificant that the courts
referred to a common law of trusts, as "incorrect" as that is given the
rooting of trust law in equity. We might agree with Holmes's belief that
there should be a better reason for a rule of law than its dating from the
high middle ages, but we must remember that the Justice also believed
that the life of the law has not been logic but experience. In the context
of the rules the Revisers created, while the logic of a republican polity
might lead to the conclusion that the accumulation and concentration of
wealth must be limited by law, experience shows that the desire to pro-
vide the benefits of wealth for one's descendants without giving those
descendants complete control over that wealth is enormously powerful.
Indeed, it sometimes seems that we could write the history of the Anglo-
American legal profession as a story of lawyers finding ways to evade
legislative attempts to assert society's control over wealth, many of
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which were intended to give successors outright ownership of inherited
property. Granted the origin of the Statute of Uses was Henry VIII's
need for revenue, but the basic point remains: the legislature enacts a
rule; the courts, with the help of the profession, mold, stretch, and mod-
ify it in ways that make the effects of legislation much less radical and, in
this case as in so many others, mitigate the possible adverse effects of
the new law on the accumulation and safeguarding of wealth.'
These ruminations, however, should not make us lose sight of those
parts of the Revisers' law of trusts that stuck. Their novel approach to
the Rule Against Perpetuities is still part of New York law,2 existing
alongside the more familiar rule prohibiting too remote vesting (which
became part of the State's law in the 1960s). 3 The protection of the in-
terests of income beneficiaries of trusts from creditors of the benefi-
ciaries not only stuck, but became to a great degree the law of the land
when courts began to recognize spendthrift trusts in the 1880s-more
formally, to allow a privately imposed restraint on an equitable interest,
although that recognition is different from a statute that makes an in-
come interest inalienable. What didn't stick, of course, was the limit on
the purposes for which a trust could be created, the provision in the
Revised Statutes that had most potential for severely limiting trusts as
devices for transmitting accumulated wealth while keeping it out of the
control of those who benefit from it. The trusts at the heart of George
Lorillard's estate plan did violate the two-life rule, but that is a limita-
tion good drafting dealt with for many decades until the "lives in being
plus 21 years" limitation became the law of New York as part of adding
the remoteness of vesting rule to the statutory perpetuities regime. The
prohibition on creating a trust to simply collect income and distribute it
to the beneficiaries probably is not vulnerable to careful, sophisticated
drafting, no matter how adept. Of course the profession never had to
try because the statute was eviscerated by the Court of Appeals-and
trusts violating the statute as interpreted in Coster v. Lorillard probably
existed without challenge in the period between the decision of the
Court of Errors and the decision of the new high court in Leggett v.
Perkins.4
1 I do not want to gloss over the part the less than precise drafting of the trust
provisions of the Revised Statutes played in the ultimate result let alone the role of courts
in general in interpreting and applying statutes to situations not sufficiently considered by
the drafters-especially to situations only a super-human foresight could envision. But
the generalization, I think, can stand.
2 N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(a) (McKinney 2017).
3 § 9-1.1(b).
4 It is worth exploring the thought that by the beginning of the twentieth century
attempts to assert social control of wealth shifted to the federal level with the enactment
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Perhaps needless to say, I agree with Judge Radigan and Ms. Hill-
man that the current attempts to create a new New York Trust Code (a
bill to enact the code will soon be introduced into the legislature) may
succeed because the code does indeed codify much existing law and the
innovations it contains have been carefully researched and explained
and to a great degree are in harmony with other efforts to reform the
United States law of trusts especially as embodied in the Uniform Trust
Code. I think Prof. Brophy would quickly recognize it as an attempt at
rationalization and (limited) reformation. (And in the interests of full
disclosure I have contributed to the drafting of the new code and con-
tinue to work for its enactment.) Far from being radical, the proposal
will clarify and reinforce the existing law of trusts. The code's most inno-
vative provisions concern the modification, amendment, and even refor-
mation of trusts, provisions which have the potential to give
beneficiaries a bit more influence over the management and administra-
tion of the property held for their benefit but nevertheless remain firmly
grounded in the principle that the intention of the settlor is of para-
mount importance. For example, the reformation provision, in accord
with corresponding provision in the Uniform Trust Code, focuses on re-
forming language, even if unambiguous, to conform the settlor's intent
so long as it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
language to be changed was the result of a mistake of law or fact. This is
not a provision to be used to make the trust conform more closely, if at
all, to what the beneficiaries want.
There is another change the enactment of the proposed code will
effect: it will eliminate from New York's substantive statutory law of
trusts (as opposed to the statutory perpetuities provisions) the last ves-
tiges of the language of the Revised Statutes. So perhaps my small arti-
cle is an elegy for an understanding of the law of trusts truly passed
away. I hope it leads at least some to conclude that it should not go
unmourned.
of the income tax amendment and the modern transfer taxes, making state trust law a less
significant tool.
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